










IIMI’s mission is to create sustainable increases in the productivity of irrigated agricul-
ture within the overall context of water basins and the analysis of water resource sys-
tems as a whole. In serving this mission, IIMI concentrates on the integration of policies,
technologies and management systems to achieve workable solutions to real problems—
practical, relevant results in the field of irrigation and water resources.
The publications in this series cover a wide range of subjects—from computer mod-
eling to experience with water users associations—and vary in content from directly ap-
plicable research to more basic studies, on which applied work ultimately depends.
Some research reports are narrowly focused, analytical, and detailed empirical studies;
others are wide-ranging and synthetic overviews of generic problems.
Although most of the reports are published by IIMI staff and their collaborators, we
welcome contributions from others. Each report is reviewed internally, by IIMI’s own
staff, by IIMI’s senior research associates and by other external reviewers. The reports
are published and distributed both in hard copy and electronically. They may be cop-
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Summary
This report draws on the substantial literature on suc-
cessful self-governing irrigation systems and applies
their principles to the design of institutions on gov-
ernment-managed systems. Its basic hypothesis is that
single irrigation systems managed by autonomous
system-specific organizations accountable to their cus-
tomers perform better and are more sustainable than
systems managed by agencies dependent on the gov-
ernment (organizationally and financially), or by
agencies responsible for many different systems. A
matrix of autonomy-dependence and single-multiple
systems is used to classify selected cases. These are
discussed to establish the plausibility of the basic hy-
pothesis. Further detailed research would be useful to
refine the hypothesis. This will be difficult to do with
existing data, but the report makes several sugges-
tions for further research. The findings are sufficiently
persuasive that policy makers can use them in de-
signing reform programs.1
This report addresses a question that is fun-
damental to the future productivity and
sustainability of irrigated agriculture in
many developing countries: what institu-
tional conditions and principles are most
conducive to achieving and sustaining high
performance in those gravity irrigation sys-
tems currently owned and managed by
government agencies? The report explores
the hypothesis that irrigation systems man-
aged by financially and organizationally
autonomous system-specific organizations
that are accountable to their customers per-
form better and are more sustainable than
systems managed by agencies dependent on
the government and agencies responsible
for many systems.
There is a substantial literature on in-
digenous farmer-managed irrigation sys-
tems. Researchers have generally empha-
sized the strengths of such systems, identi-
fied underlying principles believed to be the
foundation of their success, and proposed
ways governments can support their con-
tinuation and improvement. But a large pro-
portion of the total irrigated area in devel-
oping countries receives its water through
systems constructed, owned, and adminis-
tered by government agencies. Most of
these systems are individually relatively
large compared with farmer-managed sys-
tems in a given country. Researchers have
documented the experiences with water us-
ers associations (WUAs) at the tertiary and




secondary levels of government-managed
systems, focusing on methods for organiz-
ing WUAs and the potential roles, benefits,
and advantages of WUAs (and rarely the
disadvantages and costs of WUAs). Some of
this work recommends that government
agencies must themselves change to enable
them to support WUAs.
However, this literature makes a crucial
assumption: that the government agency
will continue to retain primary responsibil-
ity for overall system management in the
larger systems and will share some of these
responsibilities with farmer organizations.
Although there are variations in what tasks
and responsibilities are shared, turned over
to farmers, or retained by the government,
the most frequent pattern in Asia is one in
which the government retains overall own-
ership and financial responsibility for the
system and control over the water resource,
reservoirs, and main canals. Maintenance
and (perhaps) operation of lower-level ca-
nals are turned over to WUAs. Representa-
tives of farmers may or may not be con-
sulted on policy issues affecting the larger
system.
The fundamental problem is that while
public organizations, under various forms
of pressure, have agreed to share many of
the responsibilities—especially the expenses
and hard work—of system management
with farmer organizations, there is no sig-
nificant change in the power relations be-2
tween officials and farmers. Mutual ac-
countability is absent. Officials have no in-
centives to foster independent WUAs.
Farmer organizations remain dependent on
the public organization legally, financially,
and psychologically. “Joint management” as
currently practiced is often business as
usual with cosmetic changes.
This report selectively synthesizes re-
cent research results and introduces a con-
ceptual framework for classifying systems
that links two basic institutional design
principles. It then proposes five interrelated
hypotheses on the institutional determi-
nants of performance. Although further re-
search would be useful to refine the hypoth-
eses, they are sufficiently plausible that
policy makers can act on their basis in de-
signing policy and institutional reforms. The
report therefore concludes with a brief dis-
cussion of the methodologies that could be
used for further research and makes recom-
mendations for policy makers.
Institutional Principles for Irrigation Management
Self-Governing and Government-
Managed Irrigation Systems
We can distinguish between systems that
are controlled and managed (and in most
indigenous systems, owned) by local user
organizations and systems that are owned
and, to varying degrees, controlled by gov-
ernment agencies. The first category in-
cludes both indigenous systems, which of-
ten have long histories, and systems that
have been turned over by the government
to user groups for management. Both types
are widespread throughout both developing
and industrialized countries. Terms for this
category include “irrigation communities,”
“communal irrigation,” and “farmer-man-
aged irrigation systems.” In a few countries
(e.g., USA, Mexico, Colombia), governments
transfer management control to publicly
chartered user-based district or irrigation
associations. In this report all these systems
are referred to as “self-governing” after
Ostrom (1992). There is considerable though
not unlimited variety in the size, technol-
ogy, and organization of self-governing sys-
tems.
The other class of systems—those con-
structed, controlled, and almost invariably
owned by government agencies—also in-
cludes both ancient and modern systems.
Various types of government agencies are
involved including centralized departments
usually dominated by civil engineers, area
or river-basin development authorities, and
agricultural agencies. The dependence of
these agencies on the control of political au-
thorities, their financial dependence or au-
tonomy, and the extent to which govern-
ment control extends to the farm gate or is
shared with local user groups at lower lev-
els also vary.
There is no perfect or deterministic re-
lationship between governance arrange-
ments and size or scale (Hunt 1988). There
are very large self-governing systems (in
Nepal, USA, and Argentina, for example)
and quite small government-managed sys-
tems (in Indonesia and Sri Lanka, for ex-
ample). The general tendency in countries
having both types of systems, however, is
for self-governing systems to be relatively
small and for government-controlled sys-
tems to be relatively large.3
There is a consistent though not perfect
relationship between governance arrange-
ments and performance. Tang’s (1992) com-
parative analysis of 47 systems shows
clearly that the performance of government-
controlled (or “bureaucratic”) systems is
consistently lower on several dimensions
than that of local self-governing systems.
Tang (1992, 50-57) used three outcomes as
measures of the relative performance of irri-
gation systems on which data were avail-
able: adequacy of water supply, level of sys-
tem maintenance, and “degree of rule con-
formance among cultivators.” Arranging
these measures on a Guttman scale, he
found they are closely related (coefficient of
reproducibility = 0.99). A chi-square analysis
of rule conformance and maintenance by
adequacy of water supply found that all 21
of the systems with a good water supply
had a positive rating in both rule conform-
ance and maintenance, but of the 26 cases
with an inadequate water supply, only 8
were rated positive on both rule conform-
ance and maintenance (P <0.0001) (Tang
1992, 56-57, tables 4.1 and 4.2). In compar-
ing self-governing and bureaucratic sys-
tems, he found that among the 36 having
collective-choice arrangements, self-govern-
ing systems were more likely to be rated
positive on both rule conformance and
maintenance (P <0.05). For bureaucratic sys-
tems, the result was the same—those with
collective-choice arrangements (n = 14)
tended to be rated positive on both dimen-
sions, while none of those without such ar-
rangements were rated positive on both (P
<0.05) (Tang 1992, 109, 116, tables 5.12 and
5.13).
A comparative analysis of a sample of
127 self-governing and government-man-
aged systems in Nepal came to the same
conclusion (Benjamin et al. 1994). Perfor-
mance was measured in terms of cropping
intensity, technical efficacy of infrastructure,
and water availability. On all three dimen-
sions, the performance of self-governing
systems was higher than that of govern-
ment-managed systems (P = 0.00 in all
cases) (Benjamin et al. 1994, 84-85, tables 6.1
to 6.5).
These findings, based on statistical
comparative analyses using specific perfor-
mance data, support the general perception
that self-governing systems, by and large,
perform better than government systems.
Other studies have also documented
improvements in irrigation performance
(defined in various ways in different stud-
ies) of government systems resulting from
organizing WUAs (Uphoff 1986, 1992;
Aluwihare and Kikuchi 1991; Jopillo and de
los Reyes 1988; Wijayaratna and Vermillion
1994; Plusquellec 1989; Pradhan 1993; Paul
1994
1). However, as Ostrom (1990, 167-173,
180-181) has noted in reference to one of
these cases, it is not clear how robust and
enduring these newly established WUAs
will be. Ostrom, Schroeder, and Wynne
(1993, 219) further point out that temporary
decentralization and local organizations es-
tablished as part of construction or rehabili-
tation projects often do not have a signifi-
cant long-term impact because the basic in-
stitutional framework is not changed. Paki-
stan provides a classic example of this ob-
servation (Byrnes 1992).
Design Principles for Local
Irrigation Organizations
Scholars have been fascinated for decades
by the numerous successful examples of lo-
cally constructed, owned, and managed irri-
gation systems found throughout the world.
This interest has resulted in many excellent
case studies and comparative analyses—a
recent example is a study of the Chhattis
1See also Meinzen-Dick
et al. (1994, app. I) for a
review of this evidence
based on four broad cat-
egories of performance






Mauja system in Nepal by Yoder (1994a).
An important objective has been to identify
principles and lessons that can be used in
promoting or improving farmer organiza-
tions in large government systems (Coward
1980). Here I synthesize the major principles
emerging from the most recent work aimed
at identifying the institutional principles
characterizing successful self-governing sys-
tems.
1. A supportive policy, regulatory and le-
gal environment, that recognizes the ir-
rigation community’s water rights
(Ostrom 1992; Uphoff 1986; Vermillion
1991; Yoder 1994b; Svendsen and Ver-
million 1994; Vermillion and Johnson
1995).
2. Capacity to mobilize resources ad-
equate to meet the costs of operations
and maintenance including emergency
repairs (Yoder 1994b; Freeman 1989;
Svendsen and Vermillion 1994) and
modernization (Harald Frederiksen,
personal communication).
3. Benefits exceed costs of participation,
with proportional equivalence between
benefits and costs for each irrigator—
that is, those with larger benefits pay a
larger share of the costs (Ostrom 1992;
Ostrom, Schroeder, and Wynne 1993;
Freeman 1989; Hunt 1989; Vermillion
1991; Vermillion and Johnson 1995).
4. Effective collective choice arrangements
or “organizational control of water” by
users (Hunt 1990), which will normally
have the following characteristics:
• Organizational autonomy, with
clearly defined boundaries (area and
membership), in which the users con-
trol the allocation of water,
2 and officials
derive their legitimacy and authority
from users and are accountable to users
(“internal charter of authority” in Rob-
ert Hunt’s terms) (Hunt 1989, 1990;
Freeman 1989; Ostrom 1992; Uphoff
1986; Svendsen and Vermillion 1994;
Garcés-Restrepo and Vermillion 1995).
• Financial autonomy, i.e., an institu-
tional arrangement in which the irriga-
tion management organization relies on
direct methods to raise most or all of
the resources needed for operation and
maintenance (Small and Carruthers
1991, 48-49; Svendsen and Vermillion
1994) as well as capital investments
(Harald Frederiksen, personal commu-
nication).
• Single organizational entity man-
ages a single infrastructural system
(Ostrom, Schroeder, and Wynne 1993).
• Maintenance and conflict resolution
are tightly connected to the allocation
and distribution of water and the orga-
nization can enforce rules among its
members (Ostrom 1992; Freeman 1989;
Hunt 1989; Svendsen and Vermillion
1994).
• Transparent arrangements for
monitoring performance (including fi-
nancial) (Ostrom 1992; Hunt 1989; Ver-
million 1991; Vermillion and Johnson
1995).
• Nested (or federated) organiza-
tional structure (Ostrom 1992; Freeman
1989; Hunt 1989; Uphoff 1986; Vermil-
lion 1991).
Other proposed principles whose uni-
versality is less certain are the use of gradu-
ated sanctions (Ostrom 1990, 1992), mainte-
nance of written accounts and records
(Yoder 1994b), water sufficient to meet crop
water demands (Freeman 1989),
3 general as-
sembly of members that chooses a commit-
2The literature based on
indigenous self-govern-
ing systems emphasizes
that capture of water at
its source should also be









argue, based on data
from Sri Lanka, that
farmers are more willing
to manage and maintain
systems when water is
neither absolutely scarce
nor abundant, but is
relatively scarce.5
tee of officials (Uphoff 1986), use of special-
ized paid staff for regular maintenance
(Freeman 1989), and local recruitment of
staff (Freeman 1989). “Leadership” is often
proposed as a necessary factor, but it is not
an institutional variable. Although leader-
ship can substitute for good organization in
the short run, dependence upon individu-
als’ leadership qualities alone in the absence
of strong institutions threatens the
sustainability of an organization.
Shared Management of Large
Irrigation Systems
Several pilot projects and national programs
have demonstrated the benefits of using so-
cial organizers as “catalysts” or manage-
ment consultants to help farmers to orga-
nize effective WUAs (e.g., Uphoff 1992).
These programs involve establishing WUAs
at the tertiary level to improve cooperation
among farmers for local operation and man-
agement. They differ primarily in how far
“upstream” the role of WUAs is extended
and the extent to which WUA representa-
tives are involved in overall system man-
agement policy decisions. WUAs are often
limited to tertiary-level rehabilitation and
operation and maintenance (O&M) only
(Pakistan, India, Egypt); sometimes, tertiary
WUAs are federated at the secondary canal
level and given responsibility for O&M at
this level (Sri Lanka, Philippines). In some
cases, representatives of these secondary-
level WUAs are involved in overall system-
level decision making, for example through
a joint project management committee (Sri
Lanka).
However, two related issues that re-
main problematic are (1) the relationship
between the WUAs and the government
agency and (2) the nature of the agency it-
self. The relationship between the agency
and WUAs may be formally contractual,
such as an agreement to deliver a given
quantity of water in return for an agreed fee
or an agreement that the WUA will carry
out maintenance and operational responsi-
bilities in return for a payment. The latter
may be accompanied by a rebate on the ir-
rigation service fee the association collects
on behalf of the government, as in the Phil-
ippines.
The key to success is accountability. Both
evidence and theory suggest that financially
autonomous public irrigation agencies,
which depend for a substantial portion of
their funding on farmers paying fees, pro-
vide better services (Small and Carruthers
1991; Svendsen 1992). But it is rare to find a
country where the farmers can obtain com-
pensation for losses resulting from bad irri-
gation service. That is, even where contracts
exist, their enforcement is difficult.
Accountability is especially problematic
in large public service agencies with many
different stakeholders. Such agencies are
usually structured hierarchically, with offi-
cials’ primary accountability upward to
their supervisors and to the political level.
Stakeholders of a large government irriga-
tion department include politicians, the civil
service hierarchy, the users of the services
(who are themselves not a homogenous
group), other government departments and
ministries, private firms, and donors. Even
where corruption and other such problems
are minimal, it is difficult for politicians or
senior officials at the central level to effec-
tively understand and represent the specific
interests of local users. Decentralization
within an agency may be a partial solution,
but that does not solve the problem of ac-
countability upwards. An accountability
system based on hierarchical control alone
will not serve the interests of the most rel-
evant stakeholders (Ostrom, Schroeder, and
Wynne 1993; Paul 1991) because the charter
of authority is external, not internal. In6
other words, officials are not accountable to
users.
Many researchers and practitioners rec-
ognize that sharing control with WUAs as
well as providing effective support to self-
governing systems have important implica-
tions for the roles, functions, attitudes, and
organizational structures of public irrigation
agencies. The most frequently recom-
mended solution is that the agency undergo
a process of “bureaucratic reorientation.”
The National Irrigation Agency (NIA) of the
Philippines is an oft-cited example of a pub-
lic irrigation agency that has been undergo-
ing bureaucratic reorientation with some
success (Korten and Siy 1989).
To recapitulate the key point, most
scholars and practitioners advocating
WUAs for government-managed systems
assume that such organizations are compat-
ible with the continuation of traditional
public agencies managing the higher levels
of the system. The special difficulties of de-
signing effective institutional relationships
in such systems are acknowledged, but not
explicitly or adequately addressed. Hunt
(1989) is one of the few scholars to question
the assumption that WUAs in large systems





We have noted so far that the few specific
institutional design principles that underlie
successful self-governing systems support a
high level of accountability between leaders
and irrigators, that ensuring a high level of
accountability to water users by officials in
charge of government-managed systems is
particularly problematic, and that interven-
tions based on an assumed analogy be-
tween irrigation communities and water us-
ers associations in large government sys-
tems have been only partially successful at
best. A more holistic approach is required to
design robust performance-oriented institu-
tions for managing larger irrigation systems
that are currently owned and managed by
government agencies.
Three of the four institutional principles
discussed above are broadly applicable to
all irrigation systems: supportive policy,
regulatory, and legal environment; capacity
to mobilize adequate resources; and user
benefits being greater than costs and pro-
portionally equivalent. This section focuses
on effective collective choice arrange-
ments—the fourth principle—and on the
interactions between two of its characteris-
tics: (1) financial and organizational au-
tonomy and (2) management of a single in-
frastructure by a single organization. These
two characteristics may be particularly
powerful predictors of performance of large
irrigation systems.
Relationship of the managing agency to
the government
The relationship between the management
agency and the government ranges from
“autonomy” to “dependence” in both the
financial dimension and the organizational
dimension. To simplify the presentation, I
have combined these dimensions of the con-
tinuum between autonomy and depen-
dence.
Financial dimension. An irrigation manage-
ment agency can be either financially au-
tonomous, that is, self-financing, or finan-
cially dependent on outside sources (gener-
ally the state treasury) for most or all of its
funds. In the latter case, it is the outside
source—the government—that controls and
allocates the level of resources available to
the managing agency. An irrigation manage-
4Hunt (1989, 1990) notes
the “weak analogy” in




WUAs often have only
duties, but none of the




ment agency may be considered only par-
tially independent if it receives some fund-
ing from outside sources (such as capital
funds for construction) that are not repay-
able, but is dependent on generating opera-
tional funds internally.
Organizational dimension. The concept of “or-
ganizational autonomy” is based primarily
on work by Hunt (1988, 1989, 1990), Ostrom
(1990, 1992), Ostrom, Schroeder, and Wynne
(1993), and Freeman (1989). Whether au-
thority over decisions and activities is inter-
nal or external depends on the source of the
“charter of authority”—the state or the
user-members. Hunt (1990) extends this
idea of a charter of authority to the hypoth-
esis that “organizational control of water” is
the key variable affecting farmers’ willing-
ness to participate in irrigation management
tasks.
Therefore, to define the variables
clearly, autonomous refers to a charter of au-
thority that is internal, i.e., by the consent
and agreement of the members or share-
holders, though the state may define the
rules governing such charters. It is thus au-
tonomous from the state and accountable to
the shareholders—usually its customers.
Dependent refers to a charter of authority
that is based on an external source, usually
the state. It is thus closely articulated with
the state and is a mechanism for state con-
trol. Government-managed irrigation sys-
tems are by definition dependent in terms
of their charter of authority.
Relationship of the managing agency to
the irrigation system
Ostrom, Schroeder, and Wynne (1993) have
suggested that infrastructure management
by local entities is more effective when the
entity manages a single system. I have
adapted this idea to large irrigation systems.
In many countries, a government agency is
responsible for hundreds, even thousands,
of small systems scattered over a wide area.
Monitoring performance and ensuring ac-
countability for achieving defined perfor-
mance objectives is a daunting task.
This variable has two extremes:
• a single agency or organizational entity
whose primary business is management
of one irrigation system (which in-
cludes related drainage and flood con-
trol as well as water supply infrastruc-
ture)




In comparing institutional design principles,
it is critical to examine their effects on the




Many irrigation performance indicators are
described in the literature (Rao 1993 pro-
vides the most comprehensive review). Sev-
eral useful conceptual frameworks for as-
sessing irrigation performance have also
been proposed (e.g., Small and Svendsen
1992; Murray-Rust and Snellen 1993; Bos et
al. 1994). More recently, IIMI has proposed
and begun testing a “minimum set of per-
formance indicators,” of which the most
crucial describes the additional economic
value of irrigated agriculture per unit of
water (Perry 1996). However, at present two
basic constraints make it impossible to ap-
ply a universal performance indicator for
comparative analysis of irrigation systems:8
• There is no agreement among special-
ists on what such a universal indicator
(or set of indicators) might be, because
of the variation in types of irrigation
systems, in their physical, social, and
economic conditions, and in their objec-
tives. This complexity is growing as ir-
rigation systems increasingly function
as water supply systems with multiple
uses.
• There are little data on the performance
of irrigation systems that can be used
for comparative analysis. Tang (1992),
in one of the few attempts, is depen-
dent on making rather heroic assump-
tions about the quality of performance
data, and because of the constraints im-
posed by available data, he uses a
sample of systems that is highly
skewed toward South Asia.
The present report is not definitive be-
cause of these problems. It seeks only to
show the plausibility of its hypotheses, not
prove them in a scientific sense. Therefore,
performance, as used here, refers to whether
an irrigation system is achieving its objec-
tives (where these are clearly defined) or
meeting the users’ expectations. This judg-
ment is based on data presented by the re-
searchers cited below where possible,
complemented by the researchers’ own
judgments. In the cases discussed below, I
have tried to state what criteria are being
used, but clearly the usage is subjective and
imprecise.
The long-term sustainability of irriga-
tion system performance is an important is-
sue, but there are even less data available
than for short-term performance. I use
sustainability to refer to whether an irrigation
system continues to meet its users’ expecta-
tions over time. It is conceivable that a sys-
tem generating a high economic value per
unit of water in a given period collapses
because of mining of a resource—water
tables decline or soils become saline. Fur-
ther, in many systems, rising water demand
(including expansion of nonagricultural
uses of water) and increasing pollution are
forcing changes in irrigation. Sustainability
thus represents the time dimension of per-
formance.
Because both conditions and expecta-
tions change over time, I assume that
adaptability is a key factor underlying
sustainability. By adaptability I mean the
capacity to make changes—in organization,
objectives, or infrastructure for example—
to solve problems, enhance users’ welfare,
and continue to meet users’ expectations
over time. Again, lack of data is a limiting
factor.
Hypotheses
I propose five hypotheses about the likely
relationship between institutional principles
and performance. Figure 1 summarizes the
hypotheses. It is a matrix that relates au-
tonomy-dependence (both dimensions com-
bined) and whether an agency manages a
single system or multiple systems. The first
hypothesis is the most basic; the other hy-
potheses are derived from it.
Hypothesis 1. Fully autonomous organiza-
tions accountable to their customers and
managing single irrigation systems (those in
cell 1 of figure 1) will exhibit the highest
performance, will prove most adaptive to
changing conditions, and therefore will
prove to be most sustainable.
Hypothesis 2. Dependent agencies managing
single systems (cell 2) will exhibit mixed
but generally low performance; adaptability
to changing environments will be poor, and
therefore sustainability will be problematic.9
Hypothesis 3. Autonomous agencies manag-
ing many systems (cell 3) may try to be in-
novative and customer-oriented, but dis-
persal of attention among a multiplicity of
systems will limit accountability for particu-
lar systems (except those politically fa-
vored), and therefore will limit their perfor-
mance; sustainability and adaptability will
vary among systems but will generally be
lower than those in cell 1.
Hypothesis 4. Agencies that are only partially
autonomous (i.e., organizationally or finan-
cially but not both) (cell 3) will have only
limited accountability to the users, which
will limit their performance, adaptability,
and sustainability; their performance and
sustainability will be closer to those in cell
4 than to those in cell 1.
Hypothesis 5. Dependent agencies manag-
ing many systems (cell 4) will exhibit a
wide range of performance levels, but with
a preponderance of low levels, and low
(though variable) adaptability and
sustainability.
In a recent stimulating paper, Perry
(1995) suggested there are three determi-
nants of “proper” irrigation management:
• defined water rights
• infrastructure capable of providing the
service embodied in the water rights
• assigned responsibilities for all aspects
of system operation
Perry argues that all other common is-
sues (e.g., good maintenance, sound institu-
tions) are really either a subset or a combi-
nation of these three basic elements. Water
rights, infrastructure, and responsibilities in-
teract and are interdependent—change in
one will lead to changes in the other ele-
ments. The quality and interaction of these
three elements can be used to distinguish
between functional and dysfunctional sys-
tems, a distinction that Perry argues is of
fundamental importance in formulating in-
terventions. The question is, are these three
determinants alternatives to the hypotheses
proposed in this report?
FIGURE 1.
Matrix of irrigation system governance arrangements: Performance hypotheses.
RELATIONSHIP OF AGENCY TO GOVERNMENT
Autonomous Dependent
Agency manages 1. Achieve highest performance 2. Mixed but generally low performance
a single irrigation system Most adaptive to changing conditions Low adaptability
Most sustainable Sustainability threatened
[Hypothesis 1] [Hypothesis 2]
Agency manages 3. Performance will vary among systems 2. Wide range of, but generally low,
multiple irrigation system but overall will be lower than cell 1, performance
higher than cell 4 Low adaptability and sustainability, with
Adaptability and sustainability will vary variation among systems based on
among systems but overall will be local factors
 lower than cell 1, higher than cell 4
[Hypotheses 3, 4] [Hypothesis 5]10
I argue they are not. While granting
their importance, they beg the issue of what
institutional framework is most conducive
to defined water rights, appropriate infra-
structure, and organizational arrangements
for implementation. How are water rights
to be defined and then enforced? How will
infrastructure be designed and subsequently
maintained to provide a service that fulfills
users’ rights? And how will implementation
be organized to ensure its effectiveness
through accountability to the users? This
report addresses these issues and therefore
complements Perry 1995 in that, through
hypothesis 1, it proposes such an institu-
tional framework.
Are the Hypotheses Plausible? Analysis of Selected Cases
A proper test of the five hypotheses would
require precisely operationalizing terms like
performance, sustainability, and adaptability.
A sufficient number of cases would need to
be selected randomly to enable statistical
analysis. Hunt (1988), Uphoff (1986, 1991),
and others have discussed the difficulties in
meeting such rigorous standards in irriga-
tion research. As noted above, there is no
single, universally acceptable measure of ir-
rigation performance that can be used to
compare systems. The data are inadequate,
especially for government-managed sys-
tems. Nevertheless, an analysis of cases
found in an exploratory review of literature
suggests that the proposed hypotheses are
plausible. Figure 2 groups selected systems
according to the cells depicted in figure 1.
Autonomous Agencies Managing
Single Systems (Hypothesis 1)
Single systems managed by autonomous
agencies (cell 1, figure 1) ought to exhibit
the best performance, be most adaptable as
conditions change, and be the most sustain-
able. This group includes all indigenous
self-governing systems, many of which have
certainly demonstrated their sustainability
and adaptability by surviving and continu-
ously adapting for hundreds of years. It
also includes cases of very large irrigation
systems that have substantially autonomous
management organizations; the largest re-
ported case irrigates 458,000 hectares (Hunt
1988, table 1). Maass and Anderson (1978)
describe contemporary cases that are large
scale, have high performance in terms of
water productivity, and have demonstrated
their adaptability and sustainability by sur-
viving for long periods of time.
The irrigation associations of Taiwan
are famous for their high level of perfor-
mance in terms of high crop yields and the
adequacy, equity, and reliability of water
distribution (Levine 1991; Bottrall 1981
5).
The governance arrangements have gone
through several stages since the occupation
of the island by Japan in the early twentieth
century and continue to evolve today. Irri-
gation associations are financially autono-
mous, as well as largely autonomous from
direct government control, though closely
supervised by the government. A represen-
tative assembly of water users elects a chair-
man who hires staff and has overall execu-
tive responsibility. In these systems, some of
which are quite large (up to 87,000 ha), sys-
tem managers are highly accountable to the
users.
6
The province of Mendoza in Argentina
is another interesting case. Five river basin
systems totaling 360,000 hectares are under
5Bottrall (1981) com-
pares four systems one
of which is an irrigation
association in Taiwan.
6For the past 2 years, the
irrigation service fees
have apparently been
paid by the govern-
ment, not farmers, for
political reasons; and, in
1994, the government
began appointing presi-
dents of irrigation asso-
ciations because elected
representatives “were





the overall supervision of the General Irriga-
tion Department (DGI), described as an
“autonomous and autarchic” agency
(Chambouleyron 1989). The DGI is managed
by a superintendent appointed by the Pro-
vincial Senate, and he is assisted by an ad-
ministrative council consisting of farmer rep-
resentatives. The DGI is primarily a regula-
tory agency, with its own budget and rule-
making capacity. Irrigation management is
carried out by the users through water users
associations (WUAs), which are autonomous
from the DGI and self-financing. The
Mendoza system is adaptable—for example,
a process of consolidating WUAs is currently
underway to further reduce management
costs (Chambouleyron 1995). The system’s
performance is good in terms of water deliv-
ery equity and the ratio of water deliveries
to targets (Bos et al. 1991). Again, account-
ability of the DGI and the WUAs to the us-
ers is clearly very important.
Irrigation districts in the USA and Co-
lombia are organizationally and financially
autonomous and manage single water sup-
ply systems. Recent case studies in both
countries show that returns to agriculture
have been rising, costs have been contained,
financial viability achieved, and the level of
service has at least not deteriorated after the
systems were turned over to the districts
(Svendsen and Vermillion 1994; Garcés-
Restrepo and Vermillion 1995). Mexico is
well along in making similar reforms
(Gorriz, Subramanian, and Simas 1995).
It is likely that a comparative study
would confirm the relatively high perfor-
mance and capacity for sustainability of
these types of systems, and thus confirm the
first hypothesis.
a ORMVAs (Office Regionaux de Mise en Valeur Agricole) are a partial case: they are partially autonomous financially, but their
charter of authority is derived from the government.
b NIA is a partial or mixed case: it is partially, but not fully, autonomous in financial terms, and its charter of authority is derived from
the government.
c In transition through a turnover program and therefore moving into cell 1 (autonomous, single system).
FIGURE 2.
Matrix of irrigation system governance arrangements: Examples.
RELATIONSHIP OF AGENCY TO GOVERNMENT
Autonomous Dependent
Agency manages 1. Mendoza, Argentina 2. Egypt
a single irrigation Irrigation districts, USA Haryana, India
system Irrigation districts, Colombia Punjab & Sind, Pakistan




Irrigation districts, Mexico (post-reform)
Self-governing systems, by definition
Agency manages 3. National systems under NIA, 4. Irrigation districts, Mexico (pre-reformc)
multiple irrigation systems Philippinesb Sri Lanka
Nepal
Indonesia technical systems (>500 ha)
Most West Frontier Province &
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A Dependent Agency Managing
Single Systems (Hypothesis 2)
Single systems managed by a dependent
agency (cell 2 in figures 1 and 2) are usually
large systems. Some are sufficiently inde-
pendent physically that programs to change
them to an autonomous single system (cell
1) are feasible and could lead to improved
performance in the long run (e.g., ORMVAs
in Morocco). Other cases involve extremely
large highly integrated systems that are cen-
tral to the prosperity of entire countries or
provinces and that have multiple (including
nonirrigation) uses (e.g., Egypt, Haryana in
India, Punjab and Sind in Pakistan). There
is considerable variation in the performance
of these systems, and no single indicator is
adequate for comparing them.
Egypt by many measures has a high
level of performance: its crop yields and
cropping intensity are high compared with
large systems in other developing countries.
If irrigation efficiency is measured on a ba-
sin-wide basis, it is very high because of
substantial water reuse (Keller, Keller, and
El-Kady 1995). But this system is not, as yet,
water-short; the managers attempt to, and
largely succeed in, meeting water demands.
High macro-level performance is a product
of having sufficient water to meet demands
and excellent climatic conditions for crop
growth. But users have no clear water
rights, and there is no administrative capa-
bility or other institutional means to man-
age water scarcity. Although macro-level
performance is high, there is wide variabil-
ity in crop yields and cropping intensity, in
part reflecting differential access to water,
and yields are far below the potential, given
the growing conditions (John Mellor Associ-
ates 1995). There are serious concerns about
the system’s future performance and
sustainability as demand continues to in-
crease for a fixed water supply, com-
pounded by increasing water pollution
(IIMI 1995a).
Haryana State in India is often cited as
a system with high performance in terms of
equity, reliability, and productivity per unit
of water (Malhotra, Raja, and Seckler 1984a,
1984b), but it is also facing serious waterlog-
ging and salinity problems. Pakistan’s Indus
system (especially the provinces of Punjab
and Sind), which is based on design prin-
ciples similar to Haryana’s, suffers from low
and stagnating productivity and salinity
(e.g., Kijne and Vander Velde 1992; Murray-
Rust and Vander Velde 1994; Kijne and
Kuper 1995). Unlike Haryana, its institu-
tions seem no longer able to manage the
system effectively (Bandaragoda and
Firdousi 1992). It has been argued that
overcentralized management has led to an
inability to solve local problems and pre-
vent them from threatening the integrity of
the system (Merrey 1987). Like Egypt, both
Haryana and Pakistan face increasing scar-
city and competition for a limited water
supply as demand increases.
These three cases are characterized by
hierarchical management agencies in which
decision making is centralized, and account-
ability is upward to senior civil servants
and politicians, and not directly to their cus-
tomers.
7 They are organizationally and fi-
nancially dependent. The governments of
Haryana in India and of Punjab and Sind in
Pakistan collect water rates, but these go
into the general treasury—there is no link
between the agencies’ budgets and collec-
tions. Egypt charges no fee for irrigation
services. In all three, there are either propos-
als or ongoing efforts for policy and institu-
tional reform aimed at decentralizing deci-
sion making and making the management
organizations more autonomous and self-
reliant in both organizational and financial
terms (for Egypt, see IIMI 1995b, 1995c;
Merrey forthcoming).
7During a presentation
of the previous version
of this paper in the
Netherlands, Jan Ubels
pointed out that all
modern cases of highly
centralized manage-
ment organizations for
large systems were colo-
nial creations and are
therefore a legacy left





important basis for co-
lonial governments’
control of populations.13
But given their size and complexity,
making these management organizations
completely autonomous is risky; reforms
need to be carried out step-by-step. Some of
these systems are characterized by high
rates of rent-seeking and are controlled by
powerful stakeholders. These stakeholders
will resist reforms, and may also capture
the benefits of well-intended reforms. How-
ever, governments should persevere with
reforms to improve incentives and account-
ability, while exercising overall control
through strong regulatory and consultative
mechanisms. Subsystems may be made
completely autonomous and user-based,
with enforceable contracts as the basis for
receiving and paying for water services
from the larger entity. Policy making and
regulation can be separated from provision
of service as suggested by Frederiksen,
Berkoff, and Barber (1994).
Morocco is an interesting intermediate
case. Irrigation administration is decentral-
ized to nine ORMVAs (Office Regionaux de
Mise en Valeur Agricole), which are semiau-
tonomous regional offices. They are super-
vised by the Ministry of Agriculture and
Agrarian Reform and the Ministry of Fi-
nance. Water charges are collected and used
to pay for O&M, but they are not adequate
to cover all costs; the government fixes the
price of water and makes up differences
with subsidies (Hofwegen 1994). ORMVAs
are created and controlled by the govern-
ment, which is the source of their authority.
They are therefore not accountable to users.
Autonomous Agencies Managing
Multiple Systems (Hypotheses 3
and 4)
Cell 3 in figure 2—autonomous agencies
operating many systems—is nearly empty.
One well-known case, the National Irriga-
tion Administration (NIA) in the Philip-
pines, does not fully meet the criteria. First,
NIA is only partially autonomous finan-
cially. It continues to receive various subsi-
dies, and it cannot set the amount of fees or
effectively enforce fee payment. Second, its
charter of authority is from the government,
with no user control over NIA itself; NIA is
dominated by its parent ministry. Therefore,
NIA illustrates both hypothesis 3 (even au-
tonomous agencies will show limited per-
formance if they manage many systems)
and hypothesis 4 (partial autonomy limits
performance).
NIA is an interesting case because its
relative autonomy has made its organiza-
tional culture more innovative and perfor-
mance-oriented than most systems in cells 2
(single systems, dependent) and 4 (multiple
systems, dependent). NIA has been a pio-
neer in developing methodologies and poli-
cies to promote strong irrigation associa-
tions in both “communal” systems (self-
governing systems) and “national” systems,
those owned and controlled by the govern-
ment through NIA (Korten and Siy 1989).
NIA has created cost centers for most
national systems, and it evaluates staff and
system performance using a viability in-
dex—the ratio of costs to expenditures. This
procedure is intended to motivate NIA staff
to reduce costs and improve services to en-
courage farmers to pay irrigation service
fees. Central to this program is the promo-
tion of irrigation associations to take respon-
sibility for O&M as well as fee collection in
specific subsystems (for example, a lateral).
NIA has three models of joint management
in the form of contracts:
• Type I contracts involve maintenance
contracts for certain canal lengths.
• In Type II contracts, the irrigation asso-
ciation also undertakes operations and14
fee collection, keeping a certain percent-
age of the amount collected over a
specified minimum.
• In Type III contracts, the association as-
sumes full O&M responsibility and also
amortizes a portion of the construction
costs over a period of time.
Table 1 shows the status of the develop-
ment of irrigation associations and the three
models of joint management in the Philip-
pines as of December 1992 (NIA 1992). At
that time, 75 percent of the “organized” ir-
rigation associations had taken a contract; of
these, two-thirds held Type II contracts
(maintenance and collection). Only 4 per-
cent had taken Type III contracts (“complete
turnover”).
Type III systems are not equivalent to
farmer-managed or communal systems and
the use of the term “complete turnover” by
NIA is inaccurate today.
8 In the provisions
on the obligations of NIA and the irrigation
associations under these contracts, NIA re-
tains a stronger role than it does in commu-
nal systems. More important, NIA retains
the water rights, whereas communals have
their own legally recognized water rights.
The contracts contain no explicit reference
to ownership of the system being turned
over to the irrigation associations, and NIA
retains a great deal of de facto control
(Oorthuizen and Sloot 1993, 26-27).
Wijayaratna and Vermillion (1994) discuss
the disincentives for NIA to turn over more
systems completely to the irrigation associa-
tions. Most Type III (“turned over”) systems
to date are the least viable in terms of cov-
ering costs from irrigation service fees; the
systems that are most viable financially tend
not to be turned over as they are a source of
income (“profit”) to NIA.
9
8Jopillo and de los Reyes
(1988, 3) refer to Type III
as “transforming a gov-
ernment-operated or na-
tional system into a
farmer-managed or
communal system.”
This was the original in-
tention (Romana de los
Reyes, personal commu-
nication) but was later
changed.
9In a case study of
a Type III system,
Oorthuizen and Sloot




the system farmers used
to pay; and both opera-
tional performance and
maintenance quality re-
mained at a very low
level. The irrigation as-
sociation was successful
only in recovery of fees.
TABLE 1.
Status of irrigation association development in national irrigation systems in the Philippines, 1992.
Associations Area Members
no. % ha % no. %
NIA
Total — 645,789 100 496,760 100
Irrigation associations
Organizeda 1,745 — 531,635 82 409,215 82
Registeredb 1,522 87c
Irrigation associations with contracts
Totald 1,315 75 405,814 76 278,560 68
Type Ie  (maintenance) 369 28 118,610 29 74,810 27
Type IIe (maintenance &
collection) 900 68 273,143 67 190,525 68
Type IIIe  (complete
turnover) 46 4 14,061 4 13,225 4
Source: NIA 1992, 22.
a Percentages relative to total NIA.
b With Security and Exchange Commission.
c Relative to organized irrigation associations.
d Percentages relative to organized irrigation associations.
e Percentages relative to irrigation associations with contracts.15
Data on performance of the Philippine
systems are mixed. Jopillo and de los Reyes
(1988, 210-212, table 77) show that irrigated
area and cropping intensity increased after
farmers became involved in system man-
agement in the first set of national systems
where irrigation associations were orga-
nized, but they note it is difficult to separate
the impacts of physical improvements and
farmer organizations. Svendsen (1992)
shows that based on official data on a
sample of irrigation systems, NIA’s reforms
have apparently reduced system operational
costs, while improving equity of water de-
livery, and yields per hectare have remained
constant. Merrey, Valera, and Dassenaike
(1994) compare performance data for three
systems, one each in the Philippines, Nepal,
and Sri Lanka, and show that the Philippine
system performs substantially better than
the other two as measured by water deliv-
ery and agricultural and economic vari-
ables. They attribute this difference to the
institutional strengths of the Philippine sys-
tem (specifically, a performance orientation
and accountability for service to customers)
that are lacking in the other two.
On the other hand, Oorthuizen and
Kloezen (1995), in a case study of the im-
pact of NIA’s financial policies in a single
system, found that although fee collection
rose, the quality of the service declined (see
also Oorthuizen and Sloot 1993). Lauraya
and Sala (1995), based on a study of four
systems in Bicol Province, Philippines, show
that performance is not very good. Average
yield per hectare is half the highest yields in
all four systems. The authors suggest this
demonstrates a significant yield gap. They
also suggest that the use of the viability in-
dex as a measure of performance is leading
to underinvestment in maintenance and
possible deterioration of the systems. Re-
searchers carrying out a restudy of the
economy of a village in central Luzon have
found that the irrigation system managed
by NIA has “collapsed,” and only those
farmers who can afford pumps for ground-
water are able to cultivate (M. Kikuchi, per-
sonal communication, 1995). These observa-
tions raise questions about system
sustainability.
Given the hypothesized relationship of
autonomous organizations managing single
systems to performance, the obvious direc-
tion for future reform would be to create
fully autonomous user-based management
entities in each scheme (i.e., carry the cur-
rent policy of turnover to its logical conclu-
sion). These organizations should acquire
clear water rights, thus converting such sys-
tems into true “communals.” It would be
necessary to devise incentives for NIA to
pursue this path, and it would require fur-
ther reorientation of NIA to provide techni-
cal and management support to irrigation
associations.
10 Otherwise, the present lim-
ited and dispersed accountability may in-
hibit improving and sustaining performance
over the long term.
Dependent Agencies Managing
Multiple Systems (Hypothesis 5)
The cases in cell 4 of figure 2 are more dif-
ficult to analyze because of the lack of sys-
tematic data on the range of variation in,
and overall performance of, irrigation sys-
tems . A large number of the systems in this
category are performing poorly, and the re-
sponsible agencies have been only partially
successful in implementing reforms. Mexico
has embarked on a program to shift its gov-
ernment-managed systems to management
by autonomous organizations accountable
to users (Gorriz, Subramanian, and Simas
1995). This entails transforming these sys-
tems into single systems managed by au-
tonomous agencies (cell 1), which we pre-
10Oorthuizen and Sloot
(1993) emphasize the
failure of NIA to achieve
its “democratization”
objectives in the system
they studied—the irri-
gation association was
controlled by a few in-
fluential people.16
dict will in the long run lead to improved
performance. At present little data are avail-
able on the performance impacts of this pro-
gram.
11
Sri Lanka and Nepal, like the Philip-
pines, have been experimenting with infor-
mal joint management arrangements for
about a decade. Sri Lanka and Nepal have
similar organizational models for joint man-
agement of government-owned irrigation
systems. Both include informal groups at
the tertiary levels that choose representa-
tives to more formal organizations at the
distributary level (distributary canal organi-
zations in Sri Lanka). A joint project man-
agement committee including representa-
tives of farmers and government depart-
ments is intended to make overall water al-
location and seasonal scheduling decisions
in Sri Lanka. In Nepal, this joint decision-
making process seems less formal. Some
systems in Nepal have formal water users
associations at the system level; these are
less common in Sri Lankan systems—until
recently they were not officially encour-
aged—and their role is not clear. In Indone-
sia, reforms have clearer objectives but re-
main weak in terms of accountability of
managers to users.
Nepal
In a recent review of Nepal’s experiences
with joint management Pant, Valera, and
Pradhan (1992) suggest that while the short-
term results are clearly impressive, the
sustainability of the WUAs and the joint
WUA-Department of Irrigation relationship
is doubtful. Nepal has not yet developed a
management system that would ensure suf-
ficient accountability of officials to farmers,
farmer leaders to members of WUAs, or
WUAs to the government.
12 The large num-
ber of relatively small systems spread
throughout a large country with poor com-
munications and transport, compounded by
shortage of funds and institutional weak-
nesses, make it difficult to envision how the
department can ever manage these systems
effectively and improve their performance.
A comparative study of three systems in
Nepal, the Philippines, and Sri Lanka
showed that the Nepal system ranked low-
est on all performance parameters for which
there were data (Merrey, Valera, and
Dassenaike 1994); and a data-based com-
parative study of self-governing and gov-
ernment-managed systems in Nepal (Ben-
jamin et al. 1994) also found the perfor-
mance of the latter to be poor.
Sri Lanka
IIMI has been closely associated with the
participatory management programs in Sri
Lanka since 1986 (and I have been associ-
ated with them since 1980). There are cur-
rently three sets of government agencies
implementing the participatory manage-
ment policy. First, the Irrigation Department
is trying to implement it in the small and
medium systems for which it is responsible,
in the Management of Irrigation Systems
(MANIS) program, usually through its own
staff and with no external support until re-
cently. Second, in 38 major schemes under
the Irrigation Department, a parallel divi-
sion of the ministry in charge of irrigation is
promoting the development of the partici-
patory management model as part of the
Integrated Management of Major Irrigation
Schemes (INMAS) program. In some of
these schemes, institutional organizers, con-
sultants, and training programs are sup-
ported by external assistance. Finally, since
1992, the Mahaweli Authority has had a
program similar to INMAS for the large
schemes under its control.
Reports from a recently completed com-
parative study monitoring the performance
11Preliminary results
from a survey of farmers
in three turnover dis-





(1995) describe a water
share system that has re-
cently been pilot-tested;
if this continues to be
successful, it may be-
come the government’s







of 199 jointly managed systems provide a
mixed picture (IIMI and ARTI 1995). All
INMAS schemes in the sample were re-
ported to have project management com-
mittees, about 88 percent of the distribu-
taries had organizations, and considerable
progress had been made in the “turnover”
of distributaries to farmers. However, most
farmer organizations remain dependent on
the department that gives them funds for
maintenance. The concept of turnover is not
precisely defined. It is not ownership and
does not include enforceable water rights.
Distributary canal organizations take con-
tracts for O&M from the Irrigation Depart-
ment, like the Type I contracts in the Philip-
pines, but unlike in the Philippines, the
government pays the farmers without col-
lecting irrigation fees.
Overall, the comparative study by IIMI
and ARTI (1995) shows that participatory
management has improved water distribu-
tion and that maintenance quality in dis-
tributaries and crop yields have not
changed. A significant minority of farmer
organizations have expanded into other rev-
enue-generating activities, but they depend
on government assistance for their success.
The government’s O&M costs have not
fallen, however expenditure has been
shifted from distributary canals (maintained
by farmer organizations, usually under a
contract with the government) to main sys-
tem maintenance. As in the Philippines and
Nepal, the program is stalled because there
is no commitment to a long-term objective
and no willingness to consider more radical
reforms of the government agency.
In Mahaweli systems, some turnover
has occurred and a joint management struc-
ture has been put in place quickly. The sys-
tems under the Irrigation Department’s
MANIS program show the least progress
because of the weak support. Overall, the
interviews carried out by IIMI revealed a
marked reluctance among both farmers and
officials of all departments to turn over full
O&M responsibility to farmer organizations.
Studies of other irrigation systems provide a
mixed picture, with examples of both strong
and weak farmer organizations (see TEAMS
1992; Vimaladharma 1994). Two systems in
which a local nongovernmental organiza-
tion implemented experimental institutional
strengthening programs have also had dis-
appointing results (Athukorale, Athukorale,
and Merrey 1994). In their comparative
analysis of systems in the Philippines,
Nepal, and Sri Lanka, Merrey, Valera, and
Dassenaike (1994) showed the performance
of the Sri Lanka system was very low on all
parameters—though it was regarded by the
Irrigation Department as a show-case sys-
tem.
A recent review of the experience of the
Mahaweli Authority prior to 1992 argues
that the impediments to strengthening
farmer organizations and their system man-
agement role lay primarily in the organiza-
tional structure, incentives, and philosophy
of the Mahaweli Authority itself (Merrey
1995). But the problem is deeper. It is the
result of the reluctance of Sri Lanka to carry
the participatory management policy to its
logical conclusion. Neither the Irrigation
Department nor the Mahaweli Authority
(nor some future amalgamation of the two)
will ever have the combination of resources,
incentives, and accountability to system us-
ers needed to be able to achieve a high level
of performance in the hundreds of systems
scattered around the island. Nor has the
government been willing to address the is-
sue of financing irrigation services. Irrigation
remains free, which greatly limits farmers’
interest in taking over O&M responsibilities.
Radical reform to shift Sri Lankan (and
indeed Nepali) systems to single systems
managed by autonomous agencies (cell 1),
as is underway in Mexico, may be the most18
promising long-term institutional means to
achieve sustainable high performance.
Indonesia
In Indonesia, the government is turning
over all systems under 500 hectares to wa-
ter users organizations (i.e., shifting them to
cell 1). On systems over 500 hectares, the
government is introducing irrigation service
fees. These fees are linked to giving farmers,
through their water users associations and
federations, a clear voice in defining the ser-
vice for which they are paying (Gerards,
Tambunan, and Harun 1991; Gerards 1992).
A recent carefully documented case study of
this Indonesian program has confirmed the
positive association between the use of
“voice mechanisms” (public pressure by us-
ers on service providers) by farmers
through their WUAs and the accountability
of the service provider, and it has demon-
strated that improved outcomes such as
higher cropping intensity can be attributed
at least partially to improved accountability
(Paul 1994). However, the provincial irriga-
tion services, which continue to manage
these larger systems, remain hierarchical
and dependent on the government both or-
ganizationally and financially and continue
to be responsible for multiple systems. The
next step in Indonesia’s program should be
reconsideration of the structure and role of
the provincial irrigation services.
Recommendations
The findings stated in this report are sug-
gestive and certainly not prescriptive. The
plausibility of the basic hypothesis has been
established. This basic hypothesis is that
single irrigation systems managed by sys-
tem-specific organizations that are finan-
cially and organizationally autonomous and
accountable to their customers, generally
perform better and are more sustainable
over the long term. If this report is on the
right track, the findings should be of great
interest to countries struggling to improve
the performance and sustainability of gov-
ernment-managed gravity irrigation sys-
tems. Certainly there is an urgent need for
more research, but policy makers can ini-
tiate changes now.
Methodologies for Future Research
Only a few comparative studies of irrigation
have attempted to test hypotheses about ir-
rigation performance using quantitative
data from samples of irrigation systems.
Examples are the studies by Tang (1992),
Murray-Rust and Snellen (1993), and Ben-
jamin et al. (1994). All these studies struggle
with defining variables in a conceptually
meaningful way and with finding sufficient
data. Data on irrigation system performance
and sustainability are particularly problem-
atic. Many studies are carried out by re-
searchers lacking the resources and skills to
measure performance adequately (though
their data on other dimensions are often ex-
cellent); and even researchers specialized in
performance assessment do not agree on a
universally valid set of performance indica-
tors. IIMI recently proposed such a mini-
mum set for use in its work (Perry 1996),
but at present there are few systems for
which data are available to test these indica-
tors. Establishing agreed performance indi-
cators and collecting data on a sample of
systems reflecting the diversity of irrigation
conditions in the world constitute one of19
the most important areas for research on ir-
rigation in the next few years.
Anticipating that this may take some
time, another option is to continue using
imprecise proxies as, for example, Tang
(1992) does. It is not necessary to wait to
find a single performance indicator (or set
of indicators) applicable to all systems and
data based on this indicator, to continue
seeking to understand the determinants of
performance and how it can be improved.
A related problem is sampling. No
study has yet used a sample that can claim
to be representative of the universe of irri-
gation. This too may be impossible as the
universe itself is not well known, but cer-
tain kinds of systems favored by researchers
are well-represented, while others are not
represented at all. For example, two of the
four cases from Pakistan used by Tang
(1992) are on the same irrigation system; all
the bureaucratic systems are from six Asian
countries and from one Middle Eastern
country. All but one self-governed system in
his sample are from Asia, with the Philip-
pines heavily over-represented (12 of 29
cases) (Tang 1992, 43-44, tables 3.1 and 3.2).
A proper study using statistical measures of
association among variables must be based
on a more representative sample of systems.
To create such a sample, it would be neces-
sary to delineate the major irrigation areas
of the world, identify what studies are
available for each of these areas and how
adequate they are, and attempt to develop a
sample that is reasonably representative of
worldwide variation.
Further refinement of the variables
used here will also be necessary, such as a
more precise definition of financial and or-
ganizational autonomy. But this is only the
beginning of the measurement problems in-
volved. For example, how does one mea-
sure the performance of an organization
managing hundreds of systems? The earlier
discussion of the Philippines implies there
is considerable intersystem variation. It may
be necessary to look at the data available
from different studies and attempt to arrive
at a median and standard deviation for per-
formance indicators.
No single researcher could carry out
this kind of rigorous, statistically valid,
comparative study on a global basis. One
possibility is for IIMI to establish a world-
wide irrigation system database, modeled
on the Human Relations Area Files
13, which
contains coded data on thousands of vari-
ables from hundreds of societies around the
world and is used regularly by anthropolo-
gists to test hypotheses. In principle, as an
international institution, IIMI could estab-
lish a worldwide sampling frame, identify
the cases to be used, develop guidelines for
collecting data and coding variables, code
the sample cases, and then both carry out
analyses for testing hypotheses and invite
other scholars to make use of the database.
Such a database could be used for answer-
ing many questions about the determinants
of irrigation performance.
The creation of this database would be
expensive and take years; unfortunately, it is
unlikely to be implementable and its cost-
effectiveness is uncertain. There are several
more feasible research designs, though the
results may be less-conclusive. These in-
clude case studies, before-and-after impact
studies, controlled comparisons, and action
research. Carefully done studies of cases
representing different organizational ar-
rangements can be useful, particularly if an
explicit common analytical framework and
performance indicators are employed to en-
able comparative analyses. Some of the re-
cent case studies supported by IIMI would
have been more useful if there had been
such a common framework (e.g., Yoder
1994a; Svendsen and Vermillion 1994;
Garcés-Restrepo and Vermillion 1995).
13The Human Relations
Area Files (HRAF) is a
nonprofit cooperative
organization of a large
number of American
universities which
maintains a coded data-
base of primary ethno-
graphic and other data
on a global sample of
societies (Moore 1970).20
Ex post facto studies of performance before
and after organizational changes are intro-
duced constitute another promising ap-
proach currently being explored by IIMI to
document the impact of management turn-
over (Irrigation Management Reform Group
1996). A third approach involves compara-
tive analyses of similar systems with vary-
ing organizational arrangements. Benjamin
et al. (1994) use data from a large sample of
systems in Nepal to compare the perfor-
mance of self-governed and government-
managed systems. Merrey, Valera, and
Dassenaike (1994) compare three rice-based
systems in three Asian countries to examine
hypotheses about the determinants of per-
formance. A related approach is “controlled
comparison,” in which two (or several) sys-
tems that are similar except for their organi-
zational arrangements are carefully selected
and studied in depth to test carefully con-
structed hypotheses. Finally, “action re-
search” is an option that may be useful for
both researchers and policy makers: organi-
zational innovations are implemented in a
few systems through a learning process ap-
proach facilitated by the researchers, com-
bined with monitoring both these and other
systems where no changes have been intro-
duced.
What Policy Makers Can Do Now
One reviewer of an earlier draft of this re-
port suggested that further research is un-
necessary, that we already know enough
about what kind of institutional framework
works and does not work, and that coun-
tries should get on with reforms based on
this knowledge. At the level of general orga-
nizational and management principles, there
is much truth in this position. However,
transferring arrangements deemed success-
ful in one context to another entirely differ-
ent context and translating abstract prin-
ciples into practical reality are highly prob-
lematic. Would the USA model of irrigation
districts be equally successful in, say, India
or China, with their very different social,
cultural, economic, and political conditions?
Creating the necessary conditions for suc-
cessful organizational change is usually con-
tentious and complex. The implementation
strategy and organizational design must fit
the specific context, and there must be suf-
ficient time to adapt and institutionalize.
Nevertheless, policy makers who wish to
improve the performance and sustainability
of their water services need not wait for fur-
ther research. Enough is known to design
and implement successful programs.
The term autonomous, as used here, is
not to be confused with private. As Ostrom,
Schroeder, and Wynne (1993) note, a strong
government role is necessary in most coun-
tries, not only to avoid capture of the irriga-
tion agency by an influential minority, but
also because the authority inherent in the
government is necessary for enforcing rules
to manage and conserve a common re-
source. Local authorities with specific gov-
ernment mandates for the integrated man-
agement of particular irrigation systems,
whose charter of authority derives from the
users, are an effective arrangement for man-
aging irrigation systems.
In crafting institutions, special attention
needs to be paid to incentives, both positive
and negative, through accountability of us-
ers as well as managers. An integrated ap-
proach based on the whole system, and not
fragmented between user groups and gov-
ernment departments, is essential. There-
fore, countries currently promoting partial
turnover programs face a serious problem:
water users associations in parts of systems,
partial turnover of O&M for entire systems,
or shared management through joint
farmer-government committees are not21
likely to become stable and effective institu-
tional mechanisms for managing irrigation
systems unless there is clear provision for
mutual accountability between users and
managers.
The recommendations for policy mak-
ers are therefore clear, though difficult to
implement; some have been suggested ear-
lier. Reform programs must be carefully de-
signed, strongly supported at high levels,
and based on pilot testing at the initial
stages. Countries whose irrigation manage-
ment agencies are dependent on govern-
ments financially, organizationally, or both
should design strategies to make the agen-
cies more autonomous. Countries with
highly centralized agencies that manage
single large systems should proceed with
shifting to more autonomous decentralized
structures with high levels of accountability
to the users but in a regulatory framework
that ensures equity and cost-effectiveness as
well as enforcement of contracts without
high transaction costs. Countries in which a
single provincial or national irrigation
agency manages a large number of systems
should explore ways to encourage the emer-
gence of autonomous user-based organiza-
tions in each system or perhaps in specific
watersheds. Such reforms will be successful
only if governments are willing to provide a
supportive and enabling institutional and
policy framework, positive incentives for
local users to take full responsibility and
authority for their systems, and sufficient
training and technical support.2223
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